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by Duke Law Professor James Boyle
Welcome to the inaugural issue of the Duke Law and Technology Review
iBlawg - an informal and opinionated discussion of topical issues in Law and
Technology. The DLTR staff has asked me to write an entry to start things
going, and I am delighted to do so. The theme of this section is "Predictions in
Technology Law and Policy for 2006." As my dismal history in picking stocks
indicates, I have little reason to be confident in my abilities as a prognosticator.
Consequently, I have picked three issues that, whether I am right or not about
precise outcomes, reflect some of the major trends right now in intellectual
property law. The time frames, however, may be significantly different.
#1 Google Library: Google loses in the District Court, wins in the
Appeals Court, Supreme Court denies cert.
The Google Library Project, which offers to make the world of printed material
as easily searchable as the World Wide Web, is perhaps the single most
revolutionary proposal in access to knowledge and culture after the internet
itself. Even though it will only make available short excerpts of books still
under copyright, Google will first have to copy the books it indexes in their
entirety. It allows publishers to opt out of the index for specifically identified
books. Will this be found to be a fair use? A simplistic analysis of the facts
would be that Google is copying all of the work, including many works at the
heart of copyright protection, that the copies are verbatim and not
transformative, and that they are made for commercial purposes - so that
market harm should be presumed. The four factors all cut against Google.
Thus, no fair use. But I think we can expect a little more out of the courts.
What exactly is the "use" and how should it be judged? Google needs the
copies because this is the only way to build an index. The index, and its ability
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to display targeted selections, is the goal – the copying just a means to get
there. Consider the analogy to decompilation. Software companies make
complete copies of software, for commercial purposes, precisely in order to
produce a competing product. Though the software is not at the core of
copyright protection, the evidence of direct aim at the copyright holder’s
market share is much more real than in Google. But the courts hold this to be
a fair use – the copy is merely a means along the way to produce an
interoperable program.
Alternatively, consider the graphics search engine which makes copies of
every picture on the web it can find, offering a lower quality "thumbnail" of the
picture to the searcher. Again, this was found to be a fair use. The copy was a
"means" rather than an end in itself, and the effect of the service was to further
the constitutional goals of copyright – to encourage production and
dissemination of and effective access to knowledge and culture. It is hard for
me to imagine a better reflection of that goal than Google Library – a service
which would among other things mitigate the harms from "orphan works,"
something on which the Register of Copyright recently issued a report. Indeed,
I think the overall effect of a pro-Google fair use decision will probably be as
financially beneficial to the publishers as the effect of a pro-Sony fair use
decision was for the movie industry. But just as in the Sony case, I do not
expect the publishers to see that. Which way will the courts go? I think it is
marginally more likely that a District Court will adopt the formalistic approach,
and find infringement, and marginally more likely that an Appeals Court will
reach deeper and, like other courts before it, find this to be a perfect
application of the flexible doctrine of fair use. But both of those predictions
depend entirely on which judges hear the case - something we will probably
have to wait far more than a year to find out. It is uncomfortable to say so, but
our digital Great Library of Alexandria will depend on who gets the case, how
well they know copyright law, and how good Google’s lawyers are. As for the
Supreme Court, I assume the Justices will be too busy frolicking in a cascade
of national security, abortion and commerce clause issues to take the case.
#2 The Supreme Court issues at least one rebuke to the Federal Circuit
According to some academic critics, the Federal Circuit has taken perhaps the
most obviously utilitarian body of Federal law and turned it into a bizarre
mixture of formalism, rules of thumb based on 1960’s chemistry, de facto
industry-specific rules for obviousness and occasional one-sided flights of
economic fancy. Certainly, if one compares the "reasoning" that supports the
State Street decision with the kind of analysis offered in even a mundane
antitrust case, one is struck by the way in which the Court uses extremely
general verbal formulations to sweep aside old precedent on subject matter
limitations, without even considering what effects its decision might have. (I
owe the idea of comparing methodologies across doctrinal areas to my
colleague Arti Rai. She should not be blamed for my conclusion, however.) In
the antitrust case, the court would focus like a laser beam on consumer
welfare, and even its per se rules would draw their ultimate force from a
utilitarian analysis. The Federal Circuit applies no such method, and has
disappointed many, though not all, academics as a result - a fact that the court
has born with remarkable equanimity. Indeed, the Federal Circuit has shown a
disdain for academic assessment of its work that is doubtless good for the
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supply of that scarce resource – professorial humility. Will decisions like the
ones academics have criticised so heavily be the reason that the Supreme
Court eventually steps in? Perhaps, or it could be the fact that the Federal
Circuit is viewed by many, and perhaps by its members, as "the Supreme
Court of patents" and has shown an interesting tendency to interpret prior
Supreme Court statements on patent law as though it felt the Supreme Court
should defer to it, rather than vice versa. Whatever one thinks about the
current Supreme Court, though it talks about deference and humility more than
Uriah Heep, it rarely seems to find the actual practice of these virtues
attractive, except perhaps where it is deferring to Congress’s interpretation of
the purpose behind the "limited times" requirement. Deferring to the Federal
Circuit seems distinctly less attractive. Thus, the Supreme Court may feel it
appropriate to keep the Federal Circuit on a slightly shorter leash. What will
the subject matter of the case be? It could be software, business method
patents, rules on obviousness for biotechnology, or further clarification of what
remedies are available on infringement. But my bet is business method
patents and/or software. We will just have to wait and see.
#3 Concerns about the constitutionality of the "Casting Treaty" raise
doubts about the US negotiating position in WIPO
The United States has been supporting an extension of the Rome Treaty (to
which it is not a signatory) granting broadcasters significant copyright-like
rights over material that they broadcast, whether or not the material is in the
public domain, copyrighted, licensed under a Creative Commons License and
so on. The extension would increase the term of the broadcasters’ right and,
perhaps, extend it to webcasters. Critics, including me, have decried the
Treaty as a classic example of the extension of intellectual property rights,
without empirical evidence that they are necessary, and in a way that will
simply exacerbate the existing problems with rights thickets. Apart from the
Treaty’s considerable weaknesses as a matter of policy, there are also
reasons to believe it has significant constitutional problems. While there are
multiple versions of the proposed text still being discussed, none so far as I
know, meets the requirements of the US Constitution. In particular, the Treaty,
if implemented in US law, would appear to grant copyright-like rights over core
copyright subject matter, without adhering to the Constitution’s requirements of
"fixation," "originality" and perhaps that rights be given to "authors." More
speculatively, it would appear that the Treaty might run afoul of the Court’s
announcement in the patent context that the Copyright and Patent clause
forbids the Congress from removing material from the public domain. (Whether
that limitation applies in the copyright context is something that, itself, is the
subject of different litigation.) Finally, the treaty would require considerable
ingenuity in converting into a US law that did not have substantial first
amendment problems.
How should these constitutional concerns be resolved? To answer that would
require a law review article. While Congress can certainly use other sources of
authority to legislate on material that is not copyrightable subject matter, such
as trademarks, I would argue that it may not do so on works that are at the
heart of copyright, indeed which might themselves be copyrighted by their
authors. There have been a number of cases about statutes raising similar
questions, most of which have focused on the fixation issue and the limited
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times requirement. Kiss, and Martignon, two recent District Court cases have
both found anti-bootlegging provisions unconstitutional for failing to meet those
requirements. Moghadam, an older Appeals Court case, is more equivocal. In
one way, it seems that the Broadcast Treaty would be even more problematic
constitutionally, because of the ways it flouts the originality requirement –
something which is the "essence of copyright" and of the copyright clause
limitation. On the other hand, the lack of a clear time limitation in the anti-
bootlegging statute was clearly problematic. The "casting right" would be
granted for a limited time – though it could also be gained again and again
over the same work, even one on which the copyright term had lapsed. The
underlying issues are still under active litigation in the bootlegging context, as
well as the public domain restoration context, and it is hard to predict an
outcome. What is remarkable is that questions on the constitutional issues are
yet to surface in the formation of the United States’ legal position. I would
predict that this omission is rectified in the year ahead That ought to make the
US reconsider its support for this ill-thought out measure, but I have little
confidence that it will do so.
James Boyle is the William Neal Reynolds Professor of Law at Duke, a co-
founder of the Center for the Study of the Public Domain, a board member of
Creative Commons and the faculty advisor to the Duke Law & Technology
Review.
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DLTR Editor Branch Furtado :: 2/15/06 at 11:00 pm
On behalf of DLTR, we would like to thank Professor Boyle for
offering the inaugural iBlawg. As always, he offers some
challenging questions and predictions about the future of
information policy in the months and years to come. Stay tuned for
more provacative commentary and prognostication from DLTR’s
guest bloggers…
